If the conventional wisdom is to be reassessed, there has to be a basis for discarding the conclusion that there has been an increase. Chapter 3 reconsiders the much-discussed vote percentage of incumbents from to Chapter 4 examines the net ability of incumbents to increase their vote percentages over their careers, and then Chapter 5 assesses the retirement slump.
The explanation presented here is that the change that did occur involved only Republicans. This alternative explanation of change is introduced in Chapter 6, which focuses on the long-term, gradual changes in the fortunes of the parties. Then Chapter 7 applies that framework to reinterpret the trends that have received so much attention.
Chapter 8 addresses the implications of the results of our assessment of American politics. Finally, many may still wonder how an explanation that stresses partisan shifts over time can coexist with several analyses that seem to rather convincingly demonstrate that the incumbency effect increased from the s until now. Some of the analyses that indicate an increasing incumbency effect or an increasing retirement slump are fairly complicated, quantitative, and deserve more detailed analyses.
Appendix A examines, in some detail, changes in the retirement slump indicator, and Appendix B reviews the Gelman-King analysis; these appendices are intended for those who would like a more extensive analysis of the limits of these efforts to track changes in the incumbency effect. Acknowledgments This is a project that has taken a long time.
The major challenge was in creating an accurate data file of House elections. I am greatly indebted to two students who displayed remarkable work ethics and persistence in helping me do that. We began with existing Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research data files and then checked every record to make sure it was correct. We then added in special elections and losers as a separate file so there would be a record for every winner and loser. Peter Neuberger, who has gone on to study medicine, did a remarkable job calmly checking every number. I was impressed by and very grateful for his patience with and care for this endeavor.
Every faculty member should have an assistant like Peter. Then all files were merged, and the process of checking to see if everything merged correctly began. We checked all results and all incumbency coding. The challenge, then, was why certain records were wrong and what should be done with cases that did not fit conventional patterns. A socialist in Milwaukee was elected numerous times but never seated because Congress refused to seat a socialist. Was he an incumbent, even though he never sat in the House? We decided that the answer is yes because he was the prior winner and no one was elected in a special election.
Patsy Mink from Hawaii was reelected to Congress several months after she died. Can the reelection of a deceased person count? We decided it does. Voters have a right to reelect whomever they wish. How do you code a person elected xiii xiv acknowledgments in November both to fill out a vacant seat for the rest of the year and to serve for the next full term? The issues were fascinating and often difficult. Joe Brichacek did a remarkable job pursuing errors, inconsistencies, and missing information. It became a challenge to resolve all problems by his graduation, but he did so.
He was another rare assistant, and I thank him very much. He is now in political consulting and doing well. There are probably still some errors in the data set used for this analysis, but the accuracy that does exist could never have been achieved without the dedication of Peter and Joe. Indeed, it would be surprising if those in office did not do better on average than those unelected.
The important matter is that this advantage has reportedly increased in recent decades. Numerous studies indicate that beginning in the s, incumbents were able to win more frequently and increase their vote percentages. Incumbents have always had a high success rate versus challengers, and now they do even better. Specific trends will be examined later, but several changes indicate how members of Congress have been able to change the electoral landscape.
Members are now able to increase their vote percentages from their first to their second elections more than in the past. The average percentage of the vote incumbents receive is now greater than in the s and s. More incumbents are elected with more than 60 percent of the vote, a common hurdle to achieve a safe seat. Members of the House are now able to stay in office longer than in the early s. From the s through the s, the correlation of their electoral vote to the presidential vote in their district declined, reducing the threat of loss from a national swing in sentiment against one party.
It became increasingly common for scholars and commentators to note that the incumbency effect was powerful and growing. There also appears to be a very plausible explanation of why the incumbency effect has increased. The growth of federal programs provided incumbents with more resources to deliver to their districts. Since the s, incumbents in the Congress have voted themselves larger staffs so they can engage in more contact with voters.
These larger staffs allow members to help constituents with personal problems, which can create gratitude among voters. Larger staffs and budgets mean members can send more newsletters to constituents and press releases to media outlets, increasing their visibility to voters. Incumbents also are raising more campaign funds, which allow them to buy campaign ads to present themselves to voters, boosting their name recognition and intimidating possible challengers. In short, members now have more opportunities to do things for their districts and the resources to tell voters what they have done.
Finding evidence that the vote percentages of incumbents are increasing should not be surprising. These changes in the electoral fortunes of incumbents have not been well received by critics, who have offered four main arguments about how the growing incumbency effect is bad for democracy. First, some are very troubled by the steady increase in the use of public tax dollars to fund self-promotional activities such as letters, newsletters, press releases, and government-funded appearances at local events Mayhew, b; Jacobson, They are also troubled by the practice of adding numerous pork-barrel projects to the federal budget so the local member can look good to constituents Fiorina, a, b.
They see the extensive use of public resources as an inappropriate exploitation of public tax dollars for the promotion of individual careers. Perhaps the more compelling criticisms involve the negative effects on democracy and responsiveness. The second argument is that the focus within offices on promoting members reduces the focus on issues. This reduces the role of issues and policy votes in voting decisions. Elections, which should presumably focus on policy issues, become more of a personal referendum.
Third, the greater visibility of incumbents also makes it harder for challengers to mount a campaign against them. This in turn reduces their anxiety about the next election. If competition — the prospect of a relatively close election — makes an incumbent pay close attention to district constituents, the expectation of relatively high vote percentages for incumbents will likely diminish that attention.
The safer incumbents feel, the less attention they are likely to give to the district, reducing representation and responsiveness MacRae, ; Froman, b; Fiorina, ; Griffin, Fourth, the greater the increase in the incumbency effect, the less likely it will be that swings in public sentiment will register in Congress. If the electorate dislikes the policies being enacted, but a growing percentage of incumbents are safe, then fewer incumbents will be ousted in an election.
Changes in public sentiment are less likely to translate into shifts in party dominance, and responsiveness will decline. Put simply, if Democrats or Republicans control Congress and enact policies disliked by many Americans, and if most representatives of the majority party are safe, they may be able to enact such policies with impunity. To critics, the growth of the incumbency effect has not been a desirable development. These conclusions about the advantages incumbents enjoy have now become part of the portrait of American politics presented to students.
Incumbents are now reported to be safer than in the past Herrnson, The larger and more important consequence is the impact on the political process. Members of Congress are central actors in democracy. They are the ones who seek to understand and represent constituencies.
We presume that the process of seeking reelection prompts them to be sensitive to public concerns and responsive to voters. If public and private resources are creating a process whereby challengers are discouraged and incumbents are systematically less attentive and less responsive, there are reasons to worry about the health of democracy. If these endeavors are successful, incumbents can insulate themselves from voter sentiment and reduce their responsiveness to their district electorate Burnham, The sense that incumbents are manipulating the process and blocking responsiveness and change has prompted efforts to constrain the incumbency effect.
During the s a strong movement to limit the terms of state legislators developed, driven in part by a sense that incumbents were unresponsive and out of touch and needed to be removed. The courts have ruled that members of Congress cannot be term-limited, so critics have argued that congressional budgets should be cut back and that there should be stronger limits on the extent to which members can mail constituents at public expense.
But what if the incumbency effect has not actually increased? The issue is whether this advantage has increased. What if the evidence does not justify the accepted conclusions? What if there has not been a change in the ability of incumbents to boost their vote percentages? If change has not occurred, a vaguely negative and inaccurate view of the nature of elections has been presented, and a considerable amount of skepticism about elections and incumbents is without foundation.
The process by which we reconsider established conclusions is often less than systematic. In my case the prompt to take another look at the evidence involving this issue emerged by chance. I was working on an analysis of realignment in House elections for another book Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, As a part of the analysis, I was trying to re-create the often-reported increase in the average percentage of the vote received by incumbents since Despite repeated efforts to find that increase, I was consistently finding an essentially flat trend or no increase over time.
After checking to make sure that the data and computer program were correct, I carefully reread the literature that produced the conclusion that there has been an upward trend. The footnotes of those works explained, without much justification, that all cases in which a House candidate was unopposed by a major party candidate were deleted.
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This means that portrayals of elections over time for the House of Representatives did not involve all House elections. That prompted questions about how many cases districts were being deleted, how the number had changed over time, and whether variations over time in the number of districts included had any impact on the reported trend in the average percentage of the vote incumbents receive.
The answers were intriguing. During the s, there were 70—90 seats uncontested by a major party Democrat or Republican , and that number dropped to 40—50 in the early s, just when the incumbency advantage was reported to increase. This meant that the number of cases was shifting over time and that districts previously uncompetitive were being added to the analysis.
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It also suggested the puzzling possibility that at the very time competition was reported to be declining, more districts were becoming contested. The important matter is the empirical effect of the interplay between which districts are included in the analysis and the average vote of incumbents. If uncontested districts are excluded, there is an increase over time in the average vote percentage.
If all districts are included, there is no increase. It seemed odd to me that both of these conclusions were not part of the portrait of House elections, rather than just the former. Perhaps the presumed increase was not quite so 8 an increased incumbency effect clear. This realization made me wonder if it would be worthwhile to reexamine the other standard indicators of the incumbency effect.
It appeared that acceptance of the approach to calculating the incumbency effect — deleting uncontested races — was rather uncritical. Someone had done so initially, and it became conventional practice without any debate. Perhaps there were problems with the other indicators, and the trend results of other indicators also needed to be reconsidered. And, as will be examined in subsequent pages, that review indicates that the presumption that these indicators support the claim of an increased incumbency effect should also be seen with considerable skepticism.
Not only were there reasons to reconsider the existence of certain trends, but there were also reasons to wonder if existing trends might be better explained by another framework. The underlying premise of the growing-incumbency-effect approach is that the electorate is becoming less attached to parties and that effective members of Congress can exploit that to create a so-called personal vote and increase their vote percentages. But American politics is becoming increasingly partisan, and party identification is increasing Stonecash, ; Jacobson, Furthermore, Republicans abruptly took over the House in and held it for some time, suggesting that their fortunes had improved.
Partisanship was on the rise, and Republicans seemed to be benefiting the most from this. I then realized that I had never seen the trend in safe seats defined as a member who receives 60 percent or more of the vote presented by party. The original analysis by Mayhew had been of all incumbents together, and that approach had continued. He found that the percentage of safe seats for incumbents increased abruptly in and has continued to rise since then. The results of examining the trend of safe seats by party were clear.
From to Democrats had far more safe seats than did Republicans: From to Republicans experienced a surge in their percentage of safe seats from Democrats experienced a modest decline, but the decline was not enough to offset the Republican surge, and the overall percentage of safe seats increased from The percentage for all incumbents remained higher after because Republicans maintained their new level of safe seats, while Democratic incumbents were less safe.
The overall increase was because of changes experienced by Republicans but not all incumbents.
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The implication was that an interpretation focusing on changes in the situation of all incumbents might not be the most useful one. Analyses were emerging that indicated that a focus on long-term secular realignments was useful for understanding change Black and Black, , ; Abramowitz and Saunders, ; Bartels, ; Jacobson, ; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, ; Polsby, ; Stonecash, If Republicans were the primary beneficiaries of greater incumbency security, then perhaps the focus should be on partisan changes and their effects and not on some general change advantaging all incumbents. These two encounters with data served as a prompt to take another look at the presumed increase in the incumbency effect.
The analysis that follows stems in large part from having stumbled on these puzzling and intriguing findings. The analysis was also prompted by my prior work on secular realignment. It seemed very possible, as will be explained in later chapters, that what appeared to be a greater incumbency effect was really the consequence of secular realignment. The issue became trying to figure out what we would see in electoral patterns if something altogether different realignment was driving patterns, rather than an increased incumbency advantage.
This analysis, then, is not a case of presenting a theory and then testing implications. It is first an exploration of whether the trends 1 The focus of this analysis is on secular realignment Key, and not critical realignment. The former focuses on gradual changes in the relative support that parties receive and the movement of some political groups from one party to another.
The latter focuses on abrupt changes in overall and group support and has been a prime focus of scholars such as Burnham As Mayhew has ably argued, the evidence for the presence of critical realignments as a significant source of change in American politics is weak. Not only is that evidence not strong, but there is also considerable evidence that a secular realignment perspective is far more helpful in explaining changes over the last 50 years Black and Black, ; Jacobson, ; Polsby, ; Stonecash, This issue of whether the incumbency effect has increased is in many ways a dispute about data trends: But the implications of the conclusions are much greater.
If incumbents are able to use campaign funds and the resources that come with being in office to increase their vote percentages, it suggests that there are reasons to worry about the responsiveness of our politicians and our democracy. It suggests that election results are being altered in ways we should be uneasy about and might try to change. We might limit the resources of office holders and impose greater restrictions on their ability to raise campaign funds.
But if the trends have not evolved as suggested, then there are fewer reasons to worry and less reason to be cynical. Indeed, if existing trends are a product of a gradual re-sorting of the relationship between parties and the electorate through realignment, there are reasons to see elections of the last several decades in a very different light. They may not reflect the rejection of partisanship, but rather the re-sorting of partisan attachments and the reassertion of the importance of partisanship.
He classified districts as safe if the incumbent won with 60 percent or more of the vote and marginal if the incumbent received less than that. He then compared the frequency of safe and marginal districts for the years — It was clear that the percentage of marginal districts decreased in Something happened in and in subsequent elections involving incumbents. For — an average of For — the average was Subsequent studies confirmed the existence of this trend Cover and Mayhew, Members were sending out more government-funded mail to constituents, allowing them to boost their visibility.
They were performing more constituency services, helping constituents with problems. The number of grant-in-aid programs was increasing, allowing members to claim more credit for bringing benefits to the district. They were doing more for their constituents and had more resources to advertise these efforts Mayhew, a: The combination of these activities was creating more positive visibility for members of Congress, making it harder for challengers to make a dent in their electoral fortunes.
Incumbents also had more 11 12 an increased incumbency effect 50 Percentage 40 30 20 10 0 Year Figure 2. Percentage of marginal House seats for incumbents, — There was also other evidence that broad changes were occurring in election results for incumbents. Another important trend is the average percentage of the vote incumbents won over time.
The specific data for this figure are presented at the end of Chapter 3. From the s through the late s, incumbents were securing a steadily rising percentage of the vote. Repeated studies confirmed this finding Born, Vote percentages for contested incumbents, — Members were enhancing the value of incumbency. The sophomore surge consists of the ability of incumbents to increase their vote percentages from their initial elections to their first incumbent elections.
If the perks of office were becoming more valuable, then there should be an increase in the sophomore surge, and studies indicated that there was Cover, Then there is the issue of how vote percentages of incumbents change over the course of their careers. If incumbents were doing better, then their ability to increase their vote with successive years in office should have increased. The evidence indicated they were able to do that Alford and Hibbing, Finally, there should be greater changes after they leave.
The retirement slump is the loss in partisan support in a district in the election after an incumbent chooses not to run for reelection. If incumbents are able to increase their vote percentages beyond that of the underlying partisan inclination of a district, when an open seat race no incumbent present occurs, a new candidate will not have that advantage. The vote percentage for the candidate of the same party as the retiring incumbent should be lower, reflecting the difference in the support an incumbent can create compared to someone just running for the office.
If incumbents are becoming more successful in raising their votes, then the difference between the incumbent and the candidate of the same party in an open seat should be increasing over time. Studies found that the retirement slump after was much higher than for earlier decades Cover and Mayhew, Finally, in an effort to rigorously assess how the incumbency advantage had changed over the last years, Gelman and King estimated the advantage incumbents had over challengers, after taking into account the prior partisan vote in the district and national partisan swings away or toward the parties over time.
For the first 50 years, incumbents had little advantage. Beginning in the s and s, 14 an increased incumbency effect 14 Coefficient 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 Year Figure 2. Estimates of the incumbency advantage, —, using the Gelman-King method. In short, there was a considerable volume of consistent information that the electoral fortunes of incumbents were changing. They are staying in office longer Polsby, , , and over time, their electoral fortunes were improving.
It has become more and more common to refer to the increased incumbency effect as a given of contemporary electoral politics. The focus is primarily on how to explain the advantage of incumbents Zaller, The effect is found in national elections and in state legislatures Jewell and Breaux, ; Breaux, ; Garand, ; Cox and Morgenstern, The conclusion that incumbents have an advantage in the electoral process, and have increased that advantage, seems unassailable.
Voters were living in a political context in which the differences between parties were declining. Poole and Rosenthal , , , examined the voting records of all members of the House and created the consensus about a greater incumbency effect 15 Republican Liberal -1 to Conservative 1 0. House of Representatives, by party, — Data from Keith Poole http: According to their analysis, a positive score means that members had conservative voting records, while a negative score means they had liberal voting records.
The scores for all Democratic members are averaged, as are those for Republicans. From through the s the differences had steadily declined, and by the s, there was a time of sustained diminished differences between the parties. With differences between the parties declining, it would not be surprising to find that voters would be less likely to be attached to parties and less likely to base their vote for a House member on partisan allegiances.
The evidence indicates that both of these trends were occurring. At the individual level, National Election Studies surveys found that identification with parties was declining Converse, In the decades prior to the s, there was a steady rise in ticket splitting Burnham, The partisan votes in House districts for House and presidential candidates of the same party, which were once very similar, were steadily diverging Jones, Partisan presidential and House results within House districts were becoming less connected.
The finding that the electorate was less attached to parties provided an explanation of why incumbents could pull more voters to them. An electorate less tied to parties could be moved by various activities to vote for the person. Incumbents could develop support based on a so-called personal vote and achieve a higher percentage of the vote than if voters acted primarily on their partisanship.
The activities of incumbents became important to understand, and their activities quickly became central to attempts to explain election results Wattenberg, ; Menefee-Libey, ; Brady, Cogan, and Fiorina, The central issue was whether change was a result of shifts in electoral behavior, which incumbents had limited control over, or in the activities of incumbents, which they could control Krehbiel and Wright, Using his arguments as a guide, there were efforts to understand whether partisan defection was increasing and how much incumbents had been able to raise their name recognition Abramowitz, ; Cover, Others focused more on matters incumbents could specifically control.
They examined the effects of redistricting Tufte, ; Ferejohn, As sometimes happens with accepted conclusions, however, it is valuable to take another look at the evidence. There are essentially two matters worth examining. First, is the evidence as clear as it may seem? That is, are the data, the analyses of them, and the results supportive of the conclusions reached?
Second, might there be another, more plausible explanation of whatever trends do exist?
Reassessing the Incumbency Effect
The next three chapters assess the issue of the evidence for an increased incumbency effect. There are three indicators to be examined to see if the situation of incumbents has improved. These indicators are the average vote received by incumbents, the ability of incumbents to increase their vote percentages over the course of their careers, and the decline in the partisan vote in a district after an incumbent leaves.
Together, these three indicators provide a comprehensive portrait of whether incumbents are better off. They capture the situation in any given year, the dynamics of what happens over a career, and the contrast between the presence of an incumbent and his or her absence. Assuming that election results are recorded correctly,1 the important issue is whether an upward trend actually occurred.
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As 1 The matter of the accuracy of election results is not discussed in studies, and may not be relevant here. Elections, volume 2, 4th edition Congressional Quarterly, and discovered numerous errors. In some cases, the vote percentages reported appear to constitute less than percent of all votes recorded in that contest. To try to remedy that problem, I consulted Michael J. Assuming this source is accurate, which I cannot verify, several types of errors were detected and corrected. In some cases the percentage for the Democrat or Republican candidate was missing.
In other cases a single-digit percentage was recorded for a Democrat or Republican, but that candidate actually received no votes. One kind of so-called error is particularly noteworthy. In both California and New York, cross-endorsement of candidates has occurred, and still exists in New York. In California a candidate might run with the endorsement of the Democratic and Republican parties.
In these cases Dubin records the party endorsements lines of a candidate. I was able to verify the actual party affiliations not endorsements of candidates by checking their affiliations in the prior Congress, using either results for prior elections or by consulting the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress http: In the ICPSR data set, many of these districts have no recorded votes, and these districts end up missing in analyses of vote percentages.
In New York, candidates can be cross-endorsed and then have their names listed on both lines. I checked these cases against the official results printed in the Legislative Manual for various years. He made four decisions in creating his trend analysis. First, he began the examination with a focus on incumbent vote percentages. Second, he calculated the percentage of the vote received as a While the votes on the separate lines should be added together and recorded as only a Democratic or Republican vote, the ICPSR data set records the vote on the Democratic line as the vote for a Democratic candidate and the vote on the Republican line as the vote for a Republican candidate.
The result is that a district is recorded as contested and competitive to some degree, when it was uncontested by a major party candidate. Races were recorded as closer than they were. In both of these states I corrected the data. The other party line was given a zero. The logic of this is that the general concern is the partisan vote for major party candidates. In each district, almost all candidates will have an initial party affiliation, and that will be known in the district.
If the candidate receives the endorsement of another party, the actual vote is still for a candidate of a specific party. In New York the same logic applies. While a name is listed on two or more lines, the party affiliation of each candidate is well known, and the vote is for that candidate, regardless of on which line it is received.
A similar issue involves Minnesota voting. I recorded the DFL percentages as the Democratic vote. Again, the concern is not the vote percentage recorded on a party line, but the vote percentage that a candidate of a particular party received. The DFL, which operated as a fusion party, should not have no recorded vote because it is a merger of other concerns. Results in Louisiana present a particularly difficult issue of how to record results. For some years Louisiana held an open primary, in which all party candidates could enter.
If no candidate received a majority, a runoff would be held between the two candidates with the highest percentages, even if they were in the same party.
If a candidate did receive a majority, the individual would appear on the ballot on the traditional Tuesday in November without any apparent opposition. There would then be no recorded votes, making it difficult to record a result. If a candidate received enough votes to avoid a runoff, the apparent result in November was 0 no votes or percent for no opponent. Neither option reflected the vote proportion the candidate won in the open primary.
In a study of vote percentages of members of Congress, the options of 0 or percent are not satisfactory indicators of the situation the candidate faced. These races might simply be excluded, but that also is not very satisfactory. An option is to return to the results from Dubin , which presents both the open primary and runoff results. In many of these districts, several Democrats ran along with several Republicans, and the winning percentage might be, for example, only 30 percent, compared to 13 percent for a Republican. Since, in this particular study, the concern is the vote proportion of candidates, and their relative security, the decision in this case is to record the percentages of the leading Democrat and the leading Republican.
This is not completely satisfactory since the leading Democrat might receive 30 percent, followed by a Democrat with 22 percent, and then a Republican 20 an increased incumbency effect percentage of the total major party vote. Third, he presented results in terms of the percentage of incumbent outcomes that were safe or marginal. Fourth, he included contested and uncontested races. Almost all the studies conducted since his analysis have focused on incumbents and their vote as a percentage of the major party vote. His latter two decisions, however, were set aside, and that has had significant consequences.
Rather than use the percentage of marginal or safe seats, Born argued that with the presentation of outcomes by categories, small percentage changes could result in a shift of many cases between categories and the impression with 14 percent. Recording only the leading Democrat and Republican will underrepresent the closeness of the second highest vote recipient. That is, however, also a potential issue in a state like California, where the second highest vote recipient could run on the Progressive Party and not show up if only Democrats or Republicans are recorded.
While this is a problem, it is minor because the focus in these vote records is on the proportion of winners, and the practice of recording 30 and 14 percent will reflect the percentage of the winner. The virtue of recording these percentages is that the winner actually received only 30 percent, which is not a secure position. Accurately recording and reflecting that low percentage seems appropriate in this case, and is what was done.
If a candidate was unopposed in the open primary, the candidate was recorded as unopposed and as receiving percent. The problems in California and Wisconsin may not have affected results for members of Congress if those doing data runs took care to record the vote of winners, regardless of the party lines involved. If, on the other hand, a district was recorded as having a Democratic or Republican winner, but no percentages were recorded on the Democratic or Republican lines, then these districts might show up as missing in analyses. It is not possible to tell if this occurred because most studies contain no discussions of these specifics.
In New York the problem could create clear errors of percentages. If only contested races are assessed, the New York situation will lead to this district being included, when it should have been excluded. Again, it is unknown whether this problem actually occurred in published studies because there is no discussion of such issues. Finally, several decisions about the presence of an incumbent are important.
If an incumbent loses the primary in his or her own party, but is still present in the November election on another line, an incumbent is recorded as present. If an incumbent switches parties, but still runs, an incumbent is recorded as present. If two incumbents run against each other, an incumbent is not recorded as present. In this case it is not possible to specify an incumbent percentage versus a challenger percentage, so no incumbent percentage is calculated.
Results in Louisiana present a particularly difficult issue of how to record results. For some years Louisiana held an open primary, in which all party candidates could enter.
If no candidate received a majority, a runoff would be held between the two candidates with the highest percentages, even if they were in the same party. An Introduction by Jocelyn A J Evans PDF 'This transparent and entire textbook can be important for undergraduate and graduate classes on elections and vote casting behaviour.
The Legacy of Richard - download pdf or read online Richard D. The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership - download pdf or read online Political management has made a comeback. Reassessing the Incumbency Effect by Jeffrey M. Stonecash by Robert 4. Only Republicans have improved their electoral fortunes as a result of realignment.
This valuable book provides a very different interpretation of how incumbents have fared in recent decades, and the interpretation is supported by non-technical data analysis and presentation. Paperback , pages. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Reassessing the Incumbency Effect , please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about Reassessing the Incumbency Effect. Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Sep 26, Mike rated it really liked it. Kind of changed my priorities regarding term limits; we should attack partisan congressional redistricting first.