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Bal, Mieke Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Chatman, Seymour Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film Ithaca: Coste, Didier Narrative as Communication Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. An Essay in Method Ithaca: Gerrig, Richard Experiencing Narrative Worlds: Greimas, Julien Algirdas Du sens: An Attempt at a Method Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Problems and Possibilities of Narrative Lincoln: New Perspectives in Narrative Analysis Columbus: Women Writers and Narrative Voice Ithaca: Leitch, Thomas What Stories Are. Narrative Theory and Interpretation University Park: Towards a Cognitive Theory of Unreliable Narration: O'Neill, Patrick Fictions of Discourse: Reading Narrative Theory Toronto: The Case of English Renaissance Minneapolis: Prince, Gerald A Grammar of Stories: An Introduction The Hague: The Form and Functioning of Narrative Berlin: University of Chicago Press.

Case Western Reserve UP. Two distinct concepts of narrativity can be identified in the study of literature. In this earlier tradition, a text qualified as a narrative if it contained specific communicative characteristics. Narration was bound to the presence of a mediating authority, the narrator, and contrasted with the direct presentation of events in the drama.

The existence of such a mediator between the author and the narrated world was the defining feature of narrativity in classical narrative theory. Narration, it was felt, is rooted in the way that the narrator refracts narrated reality like a prism. In the name of the quest for objectivity, he demands that epic authors renounce the use of the inherently subjective narrating authority: Franz Stanzel, for example, begins his Theory of Narration Stanzel , in which he summarizes his earlier works Stanzel , against the background of new theoretical horizons, by reaffirming mediacy Mittelbarkeit as the defining characteristic of narrative texts.

He thereby renews the status of a property that he had previously invoked as the indispensable defining feature of narration in the introduction to his Typical Narrative Situations Stanzel Texts which we describe as narrative in the structuralist sense of the word contrast with descriptive texts in that they contain a temporal structure and represent changes of state. The classical concept restricts narrativity to the domain of verbal communication, covering only those works that contain a narrating authority, or mediator, including purely descriptive sketches and travel reports, while excluding all lyric, dramatic, and cinematic texts.

The structuralist concept, on the other hand, can apply to a representation in any medium but excludes representations whose referents do not have a temporal structure and consequently do not contain any changes of state. It might seem as if we have to choose one concept or the other, but practical experience with real texts makes clear that, in fact, neither is completely satisfactory—the two concepts are either counterintuitive or insufficiently differentiated.

As a result of these shortcomings, a mixed concept has emerged in practical literary theory, and it is this hybrid notion that the present essay is intended to describe and systematize. To begin with, let us note that the concept of narrative has two basic meanings, one broad and one narrow. They can be terminologically distinguished at a later stage. Narrativity and Eventfulness 19 From the structuralist perspective, the broader concept of narrative refers to representations that contain a change of state or of situation.

In the context of this definition, a state is to be understood as a set of properties which refer to an agent or to the setting at a particular point in time. We can distinguish internal and external states on the basis of whether the represented features are linked to the inner life of the agent or to elements of setting. A state can, of course, be a combination of features of setting and internal properties of an agent.

If a change of state is brought about by an agent, we speak of an action. If it affects a patient, we have a happening Chatman The minimal condition of narrativity is that at least one change of state must be represented. The single change of state that constitutes narrativity implies at least the following: Complete identity of the properties would mean that there would not be a change of state at all, while absolute difference would prevent a change of state from occurring because the situations at the beginning and end of a change must be comparable by having something in common—if they do not, there is no thing whose state can change.

There is, however, at least one further requirement of narrativity: Some theorists have gone a step further and postulated that, in addition to the relationship of temporal sequentiality, there is also some kind of motivational relationship between the states or situations. One of the earliest of these theorists is Boris Tomashevsky Prince posits a different catalog of requirements for narrativity, which is itself reformulated by Titzmann , The requirement that there must be more than just a temporal connection between the states has been repeatedly proposed in a number different guises.

But, nonetheless, the minimal definition of narrativity can and should be formulated in such as way that it does not require the presence of an additional e. After all, only rarely do literary texts contain an explicitly expressed causality. Even if the reader of a story encounters a passage that is so explicit that it can only be read in a single, unambiguous manner, it is still the case that the reader must interpret it in order for the relations of cause and effect to be conretized.

In many works, moreover, there are actually a number of very different possible explanations for a single change of state2.

We must therefore conclude that the minimal definition of narrativity need not include causality or other motivations for changes of state. The Hamburg Narratology Research Group has discussed the question of whether the category of point of view, or perspective, should be included in the definition of narrativity; I believe that it should not.

The presence of an implicit perspective is not unique to narration but is really a property of all modes of representation. Any representation of reality presupposes the selection, naming, and evaluation of certain elements of the events that take place; and this inherently entails the presence of perspective.

In other words, every representation of reality has its own particular perceptual, spatial, temporal, axiomatic, and linguistic point of view3. Many, but by no means all structuralist definitions concur in stating that narrative texts in the broader sense described above narrate a story4. For our purposes, we shall take story as referring to the content of narrative as opposed to that of discourse. What is the relationship between story and change of state?

How many changes of state are needed to make a story? The difference between change of state and story is not a quantitative one—a story can consist of a single change of state. Instead, the difference between them lies in their extensions—the changes of state form a subset of the story. As well as represented changes of state, which are dynamic elements, a story includes static elements, which are the states or situations themselves, the settings and the agents or patients within them.

Thus, by necessity, the presentation of a story combines narrative and descriptive modes. Descriptive texts are the opposite of texts which are narrative in the broader sense that we have discussed above. Descriptive texts represent static situations: They represent a single moment in time and a single state of affairs. Description is also found in texts which represent more than one state of affairs if those states of affairs lack the double bond of similarity and contrast or are not connected to a single identical agent or element of setting. Despite the clear theoretical contrast between the methods of the narrative and the descriptive text, the boundaries between them are fluid, and deciding the category of a given text is often a matter of interpretation.

As I have shown above, a descriptive component is necessarily present in all narration—it is impossible to represent the initial and final states of a change without employing a certain amount of description. Conversely, any description can employ narrative means in order to foreground particular aspects of a situation. Thus, whether a text is descriptive or narrative in nature depends not on the quantity of the static or dynamic segments in it but on the function which they have in the overall context of the work. This functionality can assume a distinctly hybrid character. For most texts, the nearest we can get to a definitive classification is identifying the dominance of one of the two modes, which itself is a matter of interpretation.

The latter, of course, presupposes that there is an equivalence between the two situations. The reader who treats such a text as a narrative will focus on difference, that which is inconstant in the elements of the text, and thereby read a change of states into it. Conversely, the reader who understands the text as a description will treat the differences between the situations as differences between equally representative views of one and the same phenomenon and concentrate on that which the different elements have in common.

In such cases, it is clear that we are dealing with an implicit narrative structure in which the different states and the change in the seeing subject which can explain them are indirectly suggested by indices or symptoms in the description. In general, we can assume that a tendency towards narrativity develops in descriptive texts if and when a describing authority makes itself apparent in them.

Certainly, the resultant narrativity is related not to what is described but rather to the presence that describes and the way in which it does so. I propose that a text is narrative in the narrower sense of the word if it both denotes a story and, implicitly or explicitly, represents the narrating authority narrator behind that same story. This narrower definition immediately excludes the subset of showing texts which are covered by the broader definition. They are texts that represent a transformation without the mediation of a narrator—dramas, films, comic strips, ballets, pantomimes, narrative paintings, and so on.

There are, of course, other kinds of non-narrative text in addition to descriptive texts. Descriptive Other Showing The story is represented without a mediator drama, film, comic strip, narrative ballet, narrative picture, etc. Events and Eventfulness Literary theory must do more than just register the presence of changes of state. Nor is it enough to distinguish various types of change such as natural, actional, interactional, and mental ones the categories proposed in Dolezel I suggest, therefore, that we should employ a concept that has enjoyed widespread use in literary theory: In all three languages, English, German, and Russian, an event is a special occurrence, something which is not part of everyday routine.

We shall highlight the importance of exceptionality in our strict interpretation of the event concept: The event, therefore, has to be defined as a change of state that fulfills certain conditions. The first basic requirement of the event, I propose, is that its associated change of state must be factual, or real real, that is, in the framework of the fictional world. It follows that changes of state which are wished for, imagined, or dreamed are not events.

However, the real acts of wishing, imagining, or dreaming can qualify as events. The change of state that constitutes an event is neither inchoative begun nor conative attempted nor durative confined to an ongoing process. Rather, it must be resultative in that it reaches completion in the narrative world of the text. Reality and resultativity are necessary conditions of an event in the strict sense. However, it is clear that these requirements alone are not sufficient to turn a change of state into an event, for they can both be fulfilled by trivial changes of state in a narrative world.

In the following pages, I shall describe five features which I believe a change of state must display if it is to be described as an event. These features are listed in a hierarchical order because of their different levels of importance. If a change of state is to be called an event, it must display the first two features in the hierarchy to some degree at least. Furthermore, the five features are gradational and can be realized to varying degrees unlike binary features, which are either unambiguously present or absent.

This means that events can have varying levels of eventfulness. There is not a fixed universal threshold of eventfulness which a change of state must cross in order to become an event; conversely, we cannot specify a minimum level of eventfulness below which events cannot exist.

Instead, the amount of eventfulness needed to turn a change of state into an Narrativity and Eventfulness 25 event is dependent on the influence of three contextual factors: Before considering the five features which determine the level of eventfulness in a change of state, let us summarize the three analytical categories which we have introduced into our discussion. The change of state; 2. The event, a particular type of change of state that presupposes reality and resultativity and fulfills certain additional requirements; 3.

Instead, my five features are based on a reduced form of the event.

My description of them is based on the poetics of Anton Chekhov, who problematizes the naive eventfulness of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. Chekhov problematizes the no—————————————— 6 7 Words spoken to Eckermann, 25 January The border can be topographical, or else pragmatic, ethical, psychological, or cognitive. An event consists of a deviation from the normative regularity which applies in a given narrative world and which preserves the order of that world so long as it is not violated. By examining these shortcomings, we can identify more accurate features of eventfulness. The first condition of eventfulness is that the change of state must be relevant.

Eventfulness increases in conjunction with the degree to which the change of state is felt to be an essential part of the narrative world in which it occurs. Changes that are trivial in terms of the axioms which underlie the work do not give rise to eventfulness and thus, in this respect, do not produce events. The birth of the kittens is a happening of great significance for the little children Vanja and Nina. Eventfulness increases in proportion to the extent to which a change of state deviates from the doxa of the narrative i.

This does not mean that the event must rest, as Lotman suggests, on the breach of a norm or the violation of a prohibition. Instead, the essence of the event lies in the fact that it breaks with expectations. A highly eventful change is paradoxical in the literal sense of the word: A change of state that can —————————————— 8 9 Aristotle defines paradox as that which contradicts general expectation De arte rhetorica a A change of state that comes as a surprise to the protagonists in a narrative world can be perfectly predictable for an expert reader if it is a genre characteristic.

If a bride marries her groom, it is not, strictly speaking, eventful. If this happens, the failure to marry is far more eventful than the marriage everyone expects would be. Masha Shelestova seems unattainable to Nikitin, the teacher of the title, and declaring his love for her means gathering all his courage and taking a truly heroic step, for it seems completely impossible to him that he will ever be able to marry his sweetheart. Relevance and unpredictability are the primary criteria which underlie the continuum of eventfulness. A change of state must meet both of these requirements to a minimum degree, if not more, if it is to be perceived as an event.

We can then go on to consider several additional, less crucial requirements. The eventfulness of a change of state increases with its consequences for the thought and action of the affected subject in the framework of the narrated world. This sobering realization results in the desire to leave —————————————— tions concerning the course of their lives must be treated as distinct and separate notions. Chekhov frequently disguises the lack of persistence in his stories by bringing them to an end before the stories of the characters themselves have ended.

Interpreters who transform the potential of the open ending into reality are imbuing the change of state with a resultativity and persistence which are not present in the construction of the story itself. Eventfulness increases with the irreversibility of the new condition which arises from a change of state. That is to say, the more improbable it is that the original condition can be restored, the greater the level of eventfulness. In the case of rethinking prozrenie, the mental event that was of such concern to the Russian realists , an insight must be gained that excludes any return to earlier ways of thinking.

None of the converted persons could conceivably return to their godless initial position in future. Will the bride really be able to escape the circle of her old existence, or will she be drawn back into it by the force of repetition that rules the world she is trying to leave? Repeated transformations, even if they are both relevant and unpredictable, represent at best a low level of eventfulness. When it represents iteration, narration approaches the mode of description; it is anything but coincidental, therefore, that descriptive genres show a strong preference for treating iterative occurrences and actions.

Criticisms and Counter-Arguments In this essay, I have described a set of features for defining a sliding scale of eventfulness which are essentially the same as those I have developed in previous articles Schmid and various essays on www. This final section attempts to deal with a number of objections that have been raised against them. The first significant objection concerns the lack of homogeneity in the five criteria of eventfulness.

Although I have attempted to formulate the criteria in such a way that homogeneity exists between them, a certain amount of disparity is inevitable because of the fact that we are dealing with different components of eventfulness. However, any concerns that this disparity may raise are surely outweighed by the fact that the feature set has been compiled on the basis of empirical evidence. It cannot be denied that the features I have described above are subject to the influence of interpretation. This is only a problem, however, if we subscribe to the belief that interpretation is avoidable in the first place.

The fact of the matter is that there is little merit in the dichotomy between objective description and subjective interpretation. To take the example of metrics again, interpretation is not as remote from this subject as many critics would have us believe. Deciding, for example, whether a given verse form should be described as syllabotonic or purely tonic is, in many ways, a question of interpretation.

Narratology must not confine itself to providing analytical tools which can supply objective descriptions that are free from presuppositions and independent of interpretation; we have little to gain by making that our aim. To give just one example, the narrator authority, as long as it is not explicitly presented as an anthropomorphic figure but semantically dependent on symptoms in the text, is heavily dependent on interpretation. The controversy that surrounded free indirect discourse in the s shows how rich in presuppositions the models of description that we employ can be.

Even the basic task of recognizing a change of state is, more often than not, heavily dependent on interpretation, either because the explicit properties of the initial and final states are not equivalent and thus require suppositions which make them comparable, or because the difference between the states is not unambiguous.

What, then, can we learn from our inventory of criteria of eventfulness? What can they do for us? Well, they are heuristically helpful in so far as they assist us in identifying and differentiating key narrative phenomena. And, by doing so, they can help us to articulate our interpretation of a work. Eventfulness is a culture-specific and historically unstable phenomenon of narrative representation. Our inventory is therefore Narrativity and Eventfulness 31 of particular importance for dealing with problems of cultural typology and the history of literature and thought: Linguistic Department University of Innsbruck.

Lotman, Jurij Struktura khudozhestvennogo teksta Moscow. Prince, Gerald A Grammar of Stories. Tomashevsky, Boris Teoriia literatury. Poetika Moscow and Leningrad ; Reprint: Poetik, edited by Klaus-Dieter Seemann Wiesbaden: The renewed appeal of narratology has brought with it a seemingly unstoppable expansion in the range of phenomena which fall under its remit.

Do all narratives share a common core that defines narratology as a field of study? Is everything and anything we say about narrative texts, films, comic strips, or computer games a narratological statement? Do narratological methods even exist as such? Can we draw a dividing line, however ill-defined it may be, between objective description and subjective response in such a way that we can define the difference between narratological analysis and interpretation?

It is questions such as these that are posed in numerous narratological texts by critics whose aim, whether explicitly stated as such or not, is to clarify the nature of narratology itself. Finally, we shall consider the implications of our modified theoretical architecture for the generally accepted model of narrative communication 4.

Other proposals have suggested supplementing the chronological connection with a causal one. It is generally agreed, then, 1 that a narrative is a representation and 2 that the object of this representation exhibits a certain set of properties: It is clear that such a concept of narrativity cannot be equated with the content of any particular medium e. For a start, narrative material can be found in non-narrative texts e. Furthermore, it is possible for narrative texts to contain non-narrative elements e. In such cases, the text involved is defined as a narrative by its paratextually marked text type e.

That, at least, is the conventional view. The applicability of the above definition can be tested by comparing it with the codified findings of narratology as presented in various introductions to the subject5. Take, for example, the phenomenon of how time is represented, the study of which is one of the foremost success stories of narrative theory.

Now consider a different, distinctly modern phenomenon in the representation of time: In bullet time, on the other hand, it can be accelerated considerably. The description of the technique should perhaps be completed by adding that bullet time is frequently employed in order to visualize processes e. The effectiveness of bullet time as a technique stems from the fact that the physical nature of the camera, which has influenced every frame since cinema began, is overcome by the use of a virtual camera8.

This technique exploits the indexical connection which traditional film production establishes between cinematic signs and their referents. Because of the symbolic nature of the linguistic sign, it is not possible to create the same effect in the medium of language9. Let us consider a further example, internal focalization. We are all familiar with the definition of internal focalization in the narrative text; it is the situation that occurs when the scope of perception is defined by the position of a character. The spatial and temporal orientation of the narrative is bound to the first-person here and now of a particular character; fo—————————————— 6 7 8 9 Matrix Website Bullet time was made famous by the first part of the Matrix trilogy, and it did not take long for many other films to imitate the technique.

See the Matrix website for a description of the technical challenges posed by bullet time and the relationship between bullet time and the Japanese anime. The camera is a physical object with certain properties which have changed as cinema has developed. At first, it was so heavy and hard to move that tracking shots were unthinkable. Since then it has become very small and relatively easy to manipulate, but it is still a physical object, and a person can hardly move it quickly enough to circle an object several times during a couple of centimetres in the flight of a bullet while producing sharp images throughout.

Not surprisingly, the same effect can be found in animated cartoons. In films, apart from a small number of experimental exceptions, we hardly ever see things through the eyes of a character for any extended length of time. Even when we know only, or little more than, what a character knows, that character is usually seen from outside, with the result that the audience does not perceive the same things as the character but rather a combination of the character and his perceptions.

There is little to be gained by discussing the causes of these differences between the media; for our purposes, it is sufficient simply to identify their existence. Our examples show clearly enough that is hardly feasible for meaningful structural descriptions to be independent of the medium of representation Why, then, is analepsis an exception to this?

Because analepsis ultimately depends on a structural prerequisite which is practically the smallest common denominator of all narration: Effects such as analepsis and prolepsis are created when the represented order deviates from the underlying order of the actions. The number of such basic phenomena is considerably limited because in most cases, as our examples have shown, additional, mediumspecific factors come into play. It is not even unusual to find critics investigating phenomena which are completely dependent on the medium in question, as is the case with one of the richest subsectors of narratology, the study of how speech and thought are reproduced in narrative texts.

If, however, the order of the elements can only be determined on the basis of the internal logic of the action or reference to a previously known story, as in the paintings of the early Renaissance, it is clear that analepsis is not possible. Some narratologies make it perfectly explicit that they are restricted to the analysis of narrative texts or, in some cases, the even narrower domain of fictional narrative texts.

However, they do not normally indicate which of their findings are specific to the chosen medium and which are not; see, for example, Rimmon-Kenan, who has a broad concept of narrativity but a more limited narratology: Narratology and the Narrative 39 actually been produced by research in the discipline. The vast majority of narratological findings, as presented in the standard introductory texts, are clearly linked to specific media, and it is not uncommon to find that their validity is confined to the most prominent strand of narratology, the analysis of narrative texts13, It is not hard to see why this is so.

All representation takes place in a medium, and the characteristics of each particular medium dictate key properties of any representation that takes place in that medium, with the result that it is simply not possible to discuss representation in abstract terms. Overlooking medium-specific properties in order to derive a more abstract, medium-independent concept of the narrative may well be a useful way of communicating more quickly and concisely, but that does not mean that we should turn the resultant abstraction into our object of study itself, for to do so would mean hypostatizing a non-existent common element Granted, the narratives of every medium share the presence of a story, but the story is not in itself narrative; it is rather a self-contained meaningful structure which we shall consider in more detail below.

The various narratives share certain representational phenomena which follow from highly general properties of discourse and sequentiality. But these shared features are not markers of narrativity. In other words, the concept of narrative is an abstraction which should be used with care because it abstracts away from the very matter that represents the focus of narratological interest in the first place.

Chatman was one of the first to analyse the media-related differences comparatively: Chatman , He postulates the existence of narrative frames. Wolf treats the narrative as a frame which is medium-independent but then uses the prototype of narration, which is medium-dependent, as a means of orientation: Even so, it turns out that the prototype has no role in his model; instead, he develops the idea of the medium-independent narrative frame, which he uses as the basis for his model of a narratology that crosses the bounds of individual media.

In my view, however, it is precisely this concept of the narrative frame that is theoretically unsatisfactory. The reason is that the phenomena involved can actually be explained perfectly well without the introduction of such a frame. Humans recognize the story and group together everything in which they can identify a story. We shall return to the histoire as a self-contained meaningful structure in the next section.

The concept of prototypical categories should be familiar and can be summarized briefly as follows: Any of the exemplars in a category can be relatively distant from the typical exemplar without thereby losing its membership of the category. For example, the robin can be seen as the prototypical bird and the penguin as a class member which, although located at the edge of the category, is still linked to the prototype Taking a prototype of narration as our starting point brings with it two advantages for the construction of our theory. Monika Fludernik and Werner Wolf also describe narrativity by borrowing the concept of the prototype from cognitive science: As Kayser had done before her, Fludernik takes spontaneous narratives in the context of a conversation as her prototype, while Wolf takes the fairytale i.

Evidence against treating literacy as a prototypical feature can be found in the fact that everyday oral narration is far more widespread than written narration and was also socialized at an earlier date. It is also far from certain that fictionality is a prototypical feature. Moreover, fictional narration can be perfectly well described as a complex form of everyday narration, while the converse is not as plausible. Rosch ; Kleiber Narratology and the Narrative 41 some phenomenon or other in the real world e. Let us summarize our findings so far.

For a long time, the inseparability of medium and representation was widely ignored by narratologists. Today, however, it has become the centre of attention. In the traditional concept of narratology as a theoretical discipline, narratology was typically treated as a metascience, a science whose subject was a narrativity present in a wide range of unrelated media. At first, this description of the narrative was regularly combined with a corresponding disregard for the role of the medium, but it was also chosen by the mediaaware models of more modern narratology.

We have criticized this approach here on the grounds that there is little place for the idea of a universal narrative entity given that all representation is deeply and inherently dependent on its medium; not even the histoire can be treated as a defining feature of narrative. If we choose not to follow the path of hypostatizing the essence of narrativity, we must identify an alternative way of describing our field of study. This we have found in the prototype model. Our prototype is based on everyday narration; in the following pages, we shall examine the properties of this prototype in more detail and use them to define the field of study of narratology itself.

The totality of events, a sequence of individual events, is integrated into the unity of a story if, in addition to its chronological structure, the sequence of events displays a 42 Fotis Jannidis causal structure such that the events not only follow one another but also follow from 20 one another. For one thing, the criterion of causality proves to be too weak; for another, almost every story that is narrated displays properties which extend beyond the simple presence of a causal and chronological connection.

Adams has pointed out that it is rare for causality in the sense of an efficient cause to establish a sufficiently strong connection between events; he argues that the resultant gap is filled above all by the intentions of the characters involved. However, only human or human-like figures can have intentions. Carroll investigates narrative connections because his interest is directed not at narrative texts as such, but rather at the kind of connection that exists in stories which are perceived as being narrative in nature.

Narratology and the Narrative 43 be found e. We can also increase our understanding of the concept of story by considering the theory of motivation in aesthetic narrative texts. Three kinds of motivation have been identified: In general terms, then, motivation can be understood as a meaningful structure which establishes a meaningful connection between a given element of the text, and thus of the narrated world, and other such elements.

To conclude, the story is, as has been emphasized repeatedly, a meaningful structure. It gathers the totality of events, characters, and regions into an organized and meaningful whole The most important components of this meaningful structure are chronology, causality, teleology, and intentionality. In addition, narratological critics, and indeed authors themselves, have identified and described further types of meaningful structure at many different levels of abstraction In my view, it is particularly important to distinguish the meaningfully structured story from its representation in the discourse.

The narrated story, not simply the story per se, is narration. Stierle ; Schmid In the prototype, the property of closure is ascribed to the story relative to the time of narration, thus exploiting the non-identity of discourse and story that is stressed in the concept of representation. We shall examine the function of presentation i. Even in the case of fictional texts, Abbott argues, it is assumed that the fictional narrator narrates a story which has already been concluded in the fictional world. The framework of the action in such a game is determined by the game designer, but the actual course of the action unfolds only as it is shaped by the deeds of the players within the constraints of the game world.

If things are happening right now for the first time, do we call it a narrative? Narratology and the Narrative 45 Do we refer to our lives, for example, as narrative? Consequently, Abbott argues that a key criterion of narrative is that the story must exist, or appear to exist, prior to its narration, and stresses that in fictional texts we find no more than the impression of a preexisting story. However, the reason he suggests for this—the fact that our lives are taking place at this very moment—is a highly questionable explanation.

So, plausible as his example may seem, let us first examine the validity of the argument behind it. How is the point in time of narration related to the point in time of what is narrated? Is it possible for something that is happening at this very moment to be narrated? Forms of live reporting, such as radio broadcasts of football matches, illustrate that the events do not need to have come to an end before they can be narrated. The same is true of fictional narration, as the example of the epistolary novel makes clear.

Time moves forward after each letter, and each subsequent letter appears at a point in time that was still part of the future at the time of the preceding letter. The events, therefore, do not need to be completed in order for them to be narrated in the broadest sense of the word But is it not nonetheless conceivably possible that the assumption of chronological separation could still apply to the relationship between an individual event as opposed to the totality of events and its narration?

Does this mean that chronological separation is indeed a constitutive element of narration? To move to a different medium, what is the situation as far as football matches broadcast on television are concerned? In the case of a live broadcast, the gap between an event and its representation in the medium is only a matter of milliseconds, but even so it is indisputable that the separation is there. The reason for this, however, lies arguably less in the brevity of the chronological sepa—————————————— 29 30 Abbott More accurately, the epistolary novel communicates two states of affairs.

The level of the narrator is home, as outlined above, to the narrative component. At the same time, however, the real reader holds a completed book in his hand. Thus, the epistolary communication that the novel relates has closure at the level of author and reader, as can be made explicit by introducing an editorial figure into the fictional world. To return to the question of the role played by chronological separation in the category of narrative, it is clear that the separation can be anything between a few milliseconds and a much longer delay of arbitrary duration.

In addition, however, it is clear that there are certain text types e. The key point, then, is not so much the delay between the event and the narrative but rather the fact that the two are non-identical because the narrative represents the event in a medium. We can be reasonably sure that the chronological separation cited by Abbott is one of the phenomena which can be analytically identified in the prototypical concept of narration.

The presence of this chronological interval results from the fact that narration takes place in a medium. The chronological distance involved varies depending on the particular composition of the medium concerned and the way in which it is used. It should also be noted that oral narration is a unidirectional medium, while computer games are interactive and thus at least bidirectional.

This means that the constructive contribution made by the player to the development of the eventual course of a game is different in nature from the contribution of a listener or reader to material in other media. While the narrative forms which have developed up to the present point in time do sometimes permit interruptions and other interference, their existence does not depend on such manipulation. In other words, as exemplified by the prototype of narration, the narrated event sequence is not changed by the narrative.

The narrative is theoretically —————————————— 31 The present discussion does not consider the linguistic aspects of such television broadcasts. Narratology and the Narrative 47 independent of the story Interestingly, this is true even of fictional narratives, in which the story and the fictional world do not exist before they are produced by the act of narration. In certain computer games, however, the event sequence and the actions of the recipient are not independent of one another.

In the adventure game, which is considered the paradigmatic example of a narrative genre, the player has to solve puzzles whose solution causes the plot to advance, usually in the form of animated sequences The story does not depend on the player, even if many games present the player with a number of alternative courses of action from which he must choose one to pursue. The genre is thus very close to the prototype. In the MMORPG, on the other hand, the rule system and properties of the fictional world mean that there are numerous factors which condition the actions of the player—but the actual story itself is not predetermined.

It is true that the player is sometimes presented with a course of action, but it is entirely up to the player to determine the form in which it is followed, indeed whether it is followed all That is to say, the sequence of actions, the meaningful structure of the story experienced by the player, is largely dependent on the decisions of that player and of the other players.

In terms of their relationship to the prototype of narration, they are, it should now be clear, markedly borderline phenomena. Its place in the critical debate has been superseded by a constructivism whose radicalism varies depending on the extent to which the story is treated as dependent on its representation.

Hayden White was once cited repeatedly as a supporter of the more radical form of the theory, but he has since largely withdrawn from his position by replacing the concept of fiction with that of literacy. Klaus Walter believes that game and narrative in the adventure game are fundamentally separate entities with no more than a structural link between them: To complete the quests, the player usually has to undertake further journeys and perform a series of tasks.

Some players spend most of their time in the game pursuing such quests, while others avoid them completely. Our prototype of narration models a communication situation: This is plausible in so far as, because any nonfictional narrative speech can also be used in a fictional context, the more complex model of fictional narrative communication can be simplified to yield our prototypical communication situation exactly as we described it above. However, this is due not least to the fact that obvious theoretical differences between the two are completely overlooked because the more complex model quite understandably presupposes the properties of text-based fictional communication.

Thus, for example, the stability of everyday oral narratives and the frequency with which they are repeated by different narrators in a social group family, friends , is an important aspect of oral communication which, for obvious reasons, has no role in written communication. So, even though the standard model of narrative communication must be extended if it is to cover such aspects, we can still draw on it in our description of the communication situation in the prototype. Here we are faced once more with the question of what the important, ultimately even decisive features of the prototype are.

In particular, the question of whether every form of narrative must have a narrator—a source behind the utterance, behind the discourse—is not exactly trivial when it comes to defining what narratologists study. Reviewing contemporary approaches to this question, we find that there is an overwhelming consensus that the narratorial instance should be dispensed with Janik ; original version German.

Narratology and the Narrative 49 quirement allows narratology to cover more than just one particular medium. Tying narratology to the criterion of a narrator means that it is restricted to linguistic narration, which is unsatisfactory in so far as it is immediately obvious that there are a number of different forms in which stories can be represented and that the same story can be represented in several different media. However, the conventional response, which is to define the universal essence of narrativity as the representation of a story, is, in my view, highly inadequate for the reasons outlined above.

Here again, I shall argue that reference to the prototype can help clarify the situation. The narrator is the source of the discourse, one of the meaningful structures of a narrative. He is also partly responsible for another meaningful structure, that of the story. Furthermore, he pursues an objective when he narrates a story. This intentional element both leaves its mark on the first two meaningful structures and creates a dimension of meaning of its own.

If we compare this communication situation with that of nonfictional film, we can see that, because the signs in the latter are index signs, the person who manipulates them assembles the discourse in a different, in fact constructive, way. In other words, someone who tells a story orally is able to draw on a linguistic system and numerous other standardized systems, and the representation of his story is shaped by his selections from all these systems. In the film—the non-fictional film, that is—on the other hand, the director does not produce the images; but he does decide on the focus of the shot, perspective, montage, use of sound, and other aspects, all of which allow the recipient to form inferences about the director.

The differences between the media, therefore, condition different kinds of inference in the process by which meaning is created38, but this does not change the fact that the identification of an intentionally acting designing intelligence is of crucial importance in cinematic communication too. We can conclude that when the representation of events in a medium is not accompanied by such a communicating intelligence e. The ascription of intentionality also lies behind the fact that the story of a narrative is always a narrated story, a communicated sequence of events.

That is the theoretical difference between the story of a narrative and other kinds of event sequence, not only because of the role of the medium but far more because of the constant involvement of communication. One of the well-known central principles in the thought of Paul Grice is that the analysis of communication should take account of the fact that something is being communicated and use this insight as the basis for more far-reaching inferences The same applies to narrative communication irrespective of its medium.

The communicated story is always, irrespective of the particular form in which it is represented, accompanied by an underlying layer of meaningfulness The conclusions which can and should be drawn from this, however, differ from one medium to the other. Let us summarize our findings. A story is not narrative, but the representation of a story is. It should now be clear that a media-independent concept of narrative is nothing more than a marginally useful hypostatized abstraction.

As an alternative, we have proposed that narrative should always be treated as something anchored in a medium.

Wilhelm Scherer

There are, therefore, separate narratologies for linguistic narration, for cinema, for comic strips, and so on. What they all share is the concept of story in the narrated world. We could correspondingly restrict narratology to examining phenomena of the histoire, such as plot structures, character models, and closure. However, such a restriction would be neither useful nor plausible in a field of study whose greatest and most productive achievements to date lie in the insights it has provided into how the histoire is represented The analysis of discourse phenomena is, of course, always and —————————————— 39 40 41 42 An interesting special borderline case would easily occur if someone were to take tapes with such recordings and use them as the object of a work of art.

See the famous William James Lectures: On this, see also Ann Rigney, who has already pointed out the potential benefits of relevance theory for the development of narratological theories: I acquiesced without much reflection not only because it was the way of least resistance but also for inner reasons: I am pretty sure that a subconscious curiosity about the historical forces that had uprooted me also influenced my choice. Similarly when years later I offered courses on fascism and National Socialism many Jewish students enrolled in them, Egon Schwarz: When I started my studies of German there was indeed reason to be concerned about anti-Semitism not only in my subject matter but also in the profession itself.

German nationalism, anti-Semitism, and Nazi sympathies were not overtly articulated. The defeat of Germany in the Second World War had pretty much silenced such voices. But professors who had held such beliefs were still around, and it was not infrequent that one was confronted with these phenomena in the secondary literature. Let me also remind you that anti-Semitism in the United States in the forties was still very strong and not at all the taboo that it is today.

It was easy for our teachers to avoid the subject of anti-Semitism in the classroom because the prevailing theory of literature was a German variant of the New Criticism that dominated literary studies in the United States as a whole. Hermeneutical interpretation of texts that excluded all consideration of history was a rule that one could only disregard at the risk of seeming crude. Contemporary literature and the postwar debates going on in Germany at that time were not part of the curriculum. Our minds were fully occupied, in addition to the tasks of teaching German as a language, with studying and having to pass examinations about everything from Gothic to Goethe and even a little beyond.

Things became different once I had gotten my degree. Already in my dissertation on Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, a stalwart of the German Enlightenment, I included a chapter about his dislike of Jews. My first job was at Harvard. The times when this institution had insisted on quotas for Jews were over, and some professors were Jews. In the German Department I was the only one and still encountered some anti-Semitism, albeit in mild form. Times were not conducive yet to a Gentile-Jewish dialogue.

Things changed for me when I went to Hamburg in the late fifties and early sixties, first as a Guggenheim Fellow and then as a Visiting Professor. While I was teaching there, the Senate of the city suggested that the faculty devote more energy to the study of literature of the German exiles. This was received with scorn. Why should one study such trash, was the general reaction. Back in the United States Guy Stern, I, and others worked hard to introduce these critical subjects into the Modern Language Association and the American Association of Teachers of German as well as into the humanities curricula.

I taught courses not only on the exiled writers but also on fascism, National Socialism, anti-Semitism and the so-called Jewish question. I also founded a German Studies Program at Washington University, which I had joined in , thus being among those who began to transform our field from purely one of literary studies into the cultural discipline it is today. But by the end of the sixties these were no longer isolated attempts. The student rebellion and youth movement in the United States and many other countries was in full swing, asking questions about the German past. At that point the idealizing reception of the Jewish scholars in the realm of thinking about German history took place.

Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis, long shunned and vilified by German scholars, were eagerly absorbed into German and Austrian intellectual life. The destinies of exiled Jewish authors of all fields became a study that occupied thousands. The Jewish character of Viennese culture was celebrated in books and seminars. Exile libraries were established, conferences held. Monumental editions of Jewish writers, for example Heine, prospered.

Holocaust studies in political science, sociology, and history were financed. This does not mean that being a Jew in German Studies had entirely ceased to be problematic. The unconstrained intercourse between Jews and Gentiles in Germany and Austria, if it had ever existed, was lost, perhaps forever. The phenomenon of philosemitism erected new barriers. I see a parallel in the debate about affirmative action. By and large the situation was a far cry from what it had been at the beginning of my career. Today the theorification of my field of learning has become pervasive and ubiquitous with the result that the concerns of ethnic identity are 32 1: The modest attempts to direct attention to the Jewish question that I undertook in my youth dwindle before this passionate onslaught.

It is a passion I cannot fully share. Perhaps one cannot expect a lot of lava from an extinct volcano. But there is more to it. A long time has gone by since questions of national, ethnic, or religious identity have occupied my mind. I grew up in the grey period between the two wars and, while I kept faith with my faithless hometown of Vienna for a long while after I had to leave it, the rush and urge to survive in the harsh environment of the Andes wiped out much of the identification I had brought along into my emigration.

Translation of «kapol» into 25 languages

All the more was I tempted to become an American after arriving in the United States. This illusion did not last long: McCarthyism, the Vietnam war, the proxy wars in Central America, racism, and more recently the treatment of the poor and the anti-immigrant wave — these and many other events and phenomena made it impossible and even undesirable for me to seek an identification with this society.

My thoroughly unreligious and anti-nationalistic orientation precluded any such adoption. In this respect I am reminded of an ironic phrase, untranslatable without destroying its flavor, that strikes me typically Viennese: I feel no inclination to privilege and much less to glorify any of the countries in which I have lived. Necessarily there arrives the moment when a person feels obsolescent in relation to the society that surrounds him or her. Maybe it is Egon Schwarz: Or to quote a fellow Jewish Viennese author, Arthur Schnitzler: The general view that the exiled Germanists held up against the Nazi horrors — the canonized memory of classical German culture in the name of Lessing, Goethe, Heine, and Thomas Mann — should be modified in the light of research on Jewish concerns today.

Jewish scholars such as Michael Brenner and Shulamit Volkov try to define Jewish identity no longer only by the experiences of the Holocaust, but in a larger, more positive context in the past. Against Goldhagen they show that there was a GermanJewish symbiosis in Germany prior to , before Hitler. Actually both refugees wanted to rescue to some extent the German Geistesgeschichte that had shaped their identities as German scholars.

But they followed different paths. Alewyn in his own research followed the traces of European culture, beginning with the Barockforschung and transcending the limits of the literary studies in writing about the theater, the opera, the garden culture and the Festkultur in Das grosse Welttheater: He seems to have used the theory of cultural poetics in his time. Alewyn had greater difficulty in entering the German departments of the United States, which were bastions of German national ideology, including Jewish exiles at that time, a fact to which Egon Schwarz has just testified.

Professor Seeba in his presentation stressed the importance of Austria as the native country of perhaps the majority of the GermanJewish scholars who emigrated to the German departments of the United States. Now she is looking for the traces of German-Jewish symbiosis too, approaching the point of view of Brenner and Volkov. In her article in a 36 1: In a letter to Ernst Beutler he wrote: It seems to me he had his roots there, as a German and as a Jew. I want to add too that — because in my own work I looked at the archives at the University of Wisconsin — I must say the records are in a very 2 dismal state.

So what we have are letters by Richard Alewyn, for example when he first found out that he was probably going to have to go to America. These letters are very interesting because they all ended up in Wisconsin since Alexander Hohlfeld, who was at the time the department head, was also the head of the American Association of Teachers of German for a very long time and hence was well known to Germanists 3 also outside of the United States. And that is the only reason they ended up in Wisconsin.

You see a lot of letters going to Hohlfeld and from other Germanists and other departments, that write: Do you know anything about this person, is he Jewish maybe? So, unfortunately, as I said, not all these universities kept good records. It is just by accident some of these records are still there. This addresses something that Hinrich Seeba said, namely that we should go into these records and see how on a departmental level this was handled.

But unfortunately a lot of these things were destroyed at Madison. And you can see that someone went in there later and x-ed out information. Which would make what Hinrich Seeba has called for a little difficult.

Meaning of "kapol" in the Malay dictionary

It is really hard to disagree with Hinrich Seeba in general — but someone has to do the dirty work, Hinrich — so I will disagree now. I see that the gist of your presentation, of your assessment comes retrospectively. You see the roots in the contribution of Jewish immigrants in the thirties and forties. I grant you, you have painted a very good picture of the general contribution back to Cassirer, but I would say the following: I have a somewhat different perspective on this.

I also came thirty years ago. I discovered this when I heard you speak. It was thirty years ago that Harvard hired me as a visiting lecturer, in It was due to Adolf Klarmann — and Henry Remak b. It was still sort of on the margins of Germanistics. However, what I learned from the older generation was an enormous love for literature. It was a love of literature. But it was expressed very well, as you have said, in many of the essays, the contributions of American or German-Jewish American Germanists. This love of literature is something that I think revitalized the discipline and I think the expansion into comparative literature — to some extent even institutionally with Erich Auerbach — and Leo Spitzer — — that is a contribution that is special.

I see it somewhat differently. I wrote my dissertation on the Austrian novel, and I should say fortunately: Austria seems to have been in the s, maybe even a little earlier, Austria seems to have been an area where academics in the United States could deal with German affairs without dealing with the Germans. Because I wanted this area of literature without the attachments of German politics, especially Nazi politics.

I think that Politzer and Klarmann and many others cherished this and integrated it. It was not until the s, the late sixties, Egon Schwarz brought it out in pointing to this generation that came in the s, more or less younger Germanists from Germany who at that time — when the American university opened up toward a lot of social unrest, but also social science, and in the sixties and seventies — that this was more the source for the interdisciplinarity that you are pointing out.

Berkeley plays an important role. I mean to What I bring to you is a differentiation of what you bring out. That is maybe a good way to now respond. I would like to take up one point Frank Trommler just made at the very end, namely what I tried to emphasize that the majority of the exiled Germanists or the exiled Jewish critics who have been so influential in the academy here, came from Austria, that this Austrian perspective allowed them to deal with German literature without dealing with Germany.

That they were twice removed from German affairs and therefore could develop a critical viewpoint on Germany, which people coming directly from Germany may not have as strongly represented. So I would see the Austrian perspective, especially after the war when Austrians were very proud of not being German and insisted a little bit too much in Austria itself that they had become the first victims of Germany, but I would see that as far as Jewish critics are concerned as an asset and not as a liability, as an asset for developing more socially concerned critical viewpoints on developments in postwar Germany.

And that is something which I tried to emphasize very much, that the autobiographical approach which Egon Schwarz emphasized in his own memoirs is a very interesting and very important development that Jewish critics taught us. So, I would say it is very important, as Egon Schwarz pointed out in his response, to emphasize the biographical approach, to look at the biographies of Jewish critics.

I think much more needs to be done there. Alewyn is an interesting case in point. But it would be interesting to look at such details, biographical details, but I would want to go beyond the biographies of individual cases and look into the effect of Jewish Germanists on the perspectives, on the goals, and the methods used in our field. And I think there the impact, even though it may not be as strong in institutional terms, may be much larger, and the autobiographical aspect leading to the concept of positionality is only one example.

That I think is something that should be not only valued but also which could be and should be emulated. The other aspect, also something that Regina Weber pointed out in her article, is to see not only the impact of Jewish critics on the development of the field here in America, but also the impact the returnees had on the development of German Germanistik. Alewyn would be just one case in point.

That he would start a summer school in German Studies with this English title I think is most interesting for perspectives which had not been common, which had not been used in Germany. That is certainly a reflection on something which he had learned here in America, and I think it is something which goes beyond literature, namely to see literature really in a cultural context. It had an effect on both the American discipline of German Studies or Germanistik as well as on Germany, and it would be interesting to look at that.

Bernhard Blume talks about his interaction, or lack of it, with the consul general in San Francisco while he was teaching at Mills. Another aspect that also was brought out by Bernhard Blume: Bernhard Blume talks about one particular student, a very attractive woman student with whom he was very taken, who then later turned out to report on him when she returned to Germany, even though she had been a very friendly and very open and very supportive student in his class.

That would be interesting too, because apparently there was an exchange program going on with students coming from Nazi Germany studying at American universities, studying with the Jewish exiles who would confront them with very different views on Germany. I think this is another area that I would like to look into more systematically — or which I would like to see looked into more systematically than has been done so far, even though the material may be somewhat limited.

I learned from Walter Schmitz that even looking at the papers of Heinz Politzer in Dresden shows a lot about the process of tenure promotions and personnel actions in Berkeley, which would be very interesting to see — especially if you happen to be one of those looked at. Wenn wir also diese Beispiele als besonders markante Kontributionen der Refugees in Amerika zur Entwicklung der Germanistik auffassen, glaube ich, da kann ich nicht mit. Or the third generation. The cohort of which I am a member is also an interesting 42 1: But it is a different kind of cultural studies and a different kind of appreciation of culture than our so-to-speak grandfathers had taught.

And I think that this American-Jewish Germanistik has also contributed in a particular way, which marks it, as I said, as this transition. In addition, Hinrich has pointed out the notion of positionality. This can be seen as both positive and negative. How explicit should that reflection be about being Jewish? The Goldhagen debate for example has brought this up — not so much in Germanistik but at least in history and in other fields.

I know far less about the matter being discussed than Professor Seeba and Professor Schwarz, and I have learned a lot from their presentations. In other words I really think that perhaps there should be more emphasis on the symbiosis here. The other point I want to make is that the word New Criticism was mentioned once, I believe in passing, by Egon Schwarz but I think it should be mentioned more often and particularly by way of emphasizing the large range of possibilities that was enacted by the refugee generation.

Many of them were New Critics in practice and not in theory, and many of them worked — Professor Wellek for example, who was one of the leaders of this, and certainly Alewyn and Blume — worked very much in the direction of close explication of individual texts. Their work tended to be quite apolitical and also by implication non-intercultural. So these are the two things that I felt need to be emphasized more strongly than they were perhaps emphasized by anyone on the board to this point.

Should we have spoken up earlier, or not at all? People were silent about it for quite a while. As far as I am concerned, I came to this country after experiencing the impossibility of doing what I wanted to do. Peter Demetz with his daughter Anne Marie, Connecticut, fall 45 46 1: I would like to add a personal footnote to what Professor Trommler said.

I was a 6 long-time student of Adolf Klarmann. I entered the University of Pennsylvania in He was a remarkable man; I was his student for many, many years. He was shabbily treated in that department, mainly because he was both Jewish and Austrian, which meant that he had two strikes against him in a heavily ethnocentrically German-oriented department.

He was engaged for much of his career in an epic, longrunning feud with an old-time German pedagogue, who was very good in his way, but they were total opposites. The the old-time German professor — with a dueling scar across his face he really looked the part — was a very good classroom teacher who categorized and systematized and organized everything heavily almost in a 7 Procrustean manner, but was very well prepared of course.

His mentality was totally different, was not systematic; he was not theoretical. I was a fairly shy, bashful, retiring young kid. I had to find my way back in his class. I went up to his office with a great deal of trepidation and I said: He had a picture of Schiller up on his wall. Klarmann — he was fabulous in drama, on figures like Grillparzer and Schnitzler, but also on Kleist and Hauptmann. He really had read afresh these works and he came up with absolutely fresh and humanistic, not academic interpretations, which were memorable.

He had rethought them based on his rich human experience. I wrote my dissertation with him. But Adolf Klarmann left you to figure this out for yourself. In the end they made peace with each other. The older man retired and went back to Germany — Dr. He wrote a conciliatory letter to his younger colleague from Germany from his retirement, so that eventually this hostility was relieved. But what I was going to say also, which gets really to the heart of the topic of this conference, the main difference between them was — there were many of them — that Klarmann had a sense of humor, a sense of irony.

So I wanted to pay tribute to Dr. Klarmann as he was my mentor for many years too. I stayed in touch with him after I finished my dissertation, and became his friend. Well, could I come back to a little bit more objective things? One of the points that struck me even today is that there is a difference in the writings and the attitudes of the refugee scholars here during the thirties and during the war; where they still largely abstained from the present, and from any sort of problems that would go beyond the text. I have looked for instance at what they were writing about, and it was Goethe.

The only twentieth-century writer that began to show up was Thomas Mann.

KAPOL - Definition and synonyms of kapol in the Malay dictionary

He was the second Goethe. With the generation of the refugees who had served in the American army who came back and who started their studies after the war. I think there is a marked difference of more self-confidence to face the past and the tradition in a different way. Of course for me the reason to look at it was that Germanistik, except for Thomas Mann, never looked at the exiled writers who lived in America during the time that they were here.

Except for one little series that Harold von Hofe 8 wrote, nobody ever bothered to contact them — Klarmann was another exception, naturally — let alone write about them while they were here and while they could be contacted and while they could be interviewed. This came much later. And I think this sort of abstention from the present is a remarkable fact, as is the coming together of the exiles and the successor generation from Germany, ours, in starting to confront the past and the present and wanting to deal with it.

I would like to pick up on something the previous speaker said, and also on something Dorrit Cohn said. They were radically alienated by the student movement in the s, and the feeling was definitely mutual. I think this is something that should also be addressed in the context. I would like to offer a comment to what Wulf Koepke just said about the position of Thomas Mann in 50 1: I think it needs to be pointed out that the role he assigned to Thomas Mann in the thirties was actually occupied by Gerhart Hauptmann, not by Thomas Mann. That came much later.

It also needs to be pointed out that Thomas Mann was invited by almost every college and university in this country except my own, alas! It was always the Comparative Literature department, or the English department or some other department, rarely the German department. For good reasons, if you go into the personnel constellations in each of those departments. One more quick comment to what Peter Demetz said earlier. There are many other cases where it is unhelpful. I would like to first of all pick up something that Frank Trommler pointed out very well, and I would like to expatiate a little bit on that love of literature.

All these people were displaced writers. This is very, very important. They were creative writers. And because they were creative writers, they were readers of literature, but in a special way. Not like the German scholars of the older school who read literature as scientists, but they read literature identifying with it and so they became excellent teachers, because teachers have to be hams.

And the ham is an actor. And as an actor interprets literature, he is the first critic: So they were artist teachers and artist scholars. I think this did not come out sufficiently. In placing this generation of And I think that differentiates them both from their predecessors, the Germanisten of the old school, but also from their successors, the sociology-minded, textual-minded, very serious scholars. They were not as serious. They were very multi-faceted.

And one more thing, something Hans Vaget brought up, about Thomas Mann being taught. That was a breath of fresh air. That was just wonderful. Because before that of course Thomas Mann was never mentioned by the other teachers. Regina Weber at that time struck me as somewhat incredulous: There are several things that were mentioned today that remind me of him. First of all what Professor Sokel just referred to, his creative writing. But certainly what we all know him for, the brilliance of his writing and his essays might also be just a transmutation of his creative skills. Second, what Professor Cohn mentioned, the fact, and here I probably dis- 52 1: I am going through old notes that I took on his seminar on young Goethe, and there were no references made to the politics of those times, let alone to the politics of his time.

When in private conversation one attempted to hear details, let us say of his exile in Switzerland, which is something that I think I know something about myself, my mother having been a refugee in Switzerland — those were conversations that he ducked. I think German literature also stopped for him with Thomas Mann. I do not say that critically, because he had that passion, that love of literature, which he transmitted to us, and he is responsible for having made us discover the love of words like no one else I could think of. Finally, what Professor Demetz said, or phrased in terms of a question: He did not deny it — it was clear who he was — but I do not think that in significant ways this affected his manner of teaching.

Not being an official respondent, I was wondering if I could ask a question. It is actually directed to Professor Seeba and it picks up on what Professor Cohn and the last speaker also mentioned. It seems to me that there is a way in which they do point to something privileged and special about Bildlichkeit, about literature. I have a hard time seeing them as harbingers or precursors of a kind of wider social perspective, and I was just wondering if you might want to elaborate a little bit on that tension.

And even Politzer in his Grillparzer study would always — as far as I read his book and as I know it from his talks, from his classes, and from many conversations — would always see the author not only as the anonymous [sic] also of a text, but as a living person in a socialhistorical-cultural context. But he would not engage political interpretation, you are correct there, and I think all those who have expressed this are very correct in saying that this generation cannot be seen, possibly with the exception of Egon Schwarz, as politically leftleaning, as supporters of causes which were closer to our hearts in the late sixties.

But what I was trying to say was that this generation anticipated many of the positions which have become theoretical positions now. Which have become conceptualized as theoretical positions, but which were never formulated as theoretical positions. Jeff Peck pointed out that positionality is something that is now possibly differently interpreted than it was by these Jewish critics at the time, but nevertheless I would say that we could use the term positionality for understanding the extent to which they have brought in personal experience, at least implicitly, into their dealings with literature.

And that is something I would miss even now when we have more theoretical discussions of positionality, that in dealing with German literature and German culture, Austrian literature, Austrian culture, today we miss the involvement of personalities who have been very much formed and been informed by their experience and it was certainly our understanding and our knowledge of the extent to which they were really framed, or by which they were guided, to the extent to which they were guided by this experience of the critical situation, of a critical life, of a crisis in life and I think that helped at least me personally very much to find a totally new approach to literature, not as a merely objective field, as I had learned to study in literary scholarship, Literaturwissenschaft, as I was trained in Germany.

I would like to refer to Dr. I am German, and I am at the moment a student at Hebrew College. I grew up in Germany after the war and I was 54 1: The students admired him and we thought his lectures were great, and I personally had to make a few attempts for getting grants. Can you bring some of his poetry? It might be an interesting question: I just want to take issue with the political. There are two things, very briefly. I do think we have a disagreement here in general, not just between Herrn Seeba and myself, but I think that the voices here have voiced some kind of questioning, friendly questioning, very friendly questioning of this excellent talk: I know that personally from conversations with them, from my contacts with them, and from their works.

They were really the old tradition of Austrian patriotism, not Seidlin of course, but Heller and Politzer; they were Kakanian patriots. So I would say that we have to distinguish between the generation of , and the generation of Egon Schwarz of , and Guy Stern who also belongs to this generation. They were of course left leaning, progressive, and very different and sociologically oriented, and it was an anathema for Heinz Politzer, but particularly for Erich Heller and Oskar Seidlin to bring in sociological considerations.

I remember how Oskar Seidlin responded to an article of mine, 9 which I had written for his Festschrift. I have two comments. I think that it is clear that the Jewish Germanists came to this country with their own likes and dislikes, their literary taste. Heinz Politzer by the way was interested in a different kind of Kakania. He taught a course at Cornell in and which began with Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg and ended with Die letzten Tage der Menschheit, so with another kind of Kakania.

But I think that many Germanists who came to this country from Germany considered certain German-Jewish writers beyond the pale, and I think this has influenced the writing of literary history up until this day. With a tribute to Alexander R. U of Wisconsin P, , — Saur, , — Rowohlt, , — University of Pennsylvania, He spent most of his career at the University of Pennsylvania and was best known for his work on Franz Werfel. For a list of publications see Views and Reviews of Modern Literature: Festschrift for Adolf D.

He took his degree in German from Strassburg in then emigrated to the United States in the same year. As of he was at the University of Pennsylvania until his retirement in He was also known as a Werfel scholar. For a list of his writings see Mit Goethe: Das Motiv erscheint auf den ersten Blick lauter: Die Nationalsozialisten stehen vor ihren Augen und wie sie viele Deutsche erst zu Juden gemacht haben. Sie unterscheidet zwischen den Diskursen und den Menschen. Von Juden kann man demzufolge nur spre- 60 2: Ich bevorzuge daher eine dialektische Vorstellung: Ich spreche hier von kulturellen Werten und der Kultur im allgemeinen.

In den Epochen, von denen ich hier spreche, steht einem philologischen Ansatz im engeren Sinn den Editionen, biographischen Detailstudien etc. Daraus entwickelte sich dann auch die Gei4 stesgeschichte zwischen und Ludwig Geiger, auf den ich mich nun konzentriere, schrieb der deutschen Kultur universalisierende Kraft zu: Die Kultur sieht Geiger auch in der Wissenschaft am Werk und kann daher keine rechte Dialektik von Kulturwerten und Wissenschaft entwickeln. Zumindest hinsichtlich seines Programms. Geiger rechnet sie generell der universalisierenden Kultur zu, doch bevorzugt er — darin besteht ei- 62 2: Mit Goethe tat er sich schwer.

Du hast sie in dieser Form nur kennen, we11 nigstens als berechtigt ehren gelernt. Juden unterschieden sich nicht von den Deutschen, sondern von den Christen. Eine der Fragen lautete: Er verliert die Instanz, die das 64 2: Das philologische Dreieck Trennen! Denn die Werte regeln nicht automatisch auch die Forschung. Doch im Seminar sieht es gern anders aus, wilder. Die Institution schafft einen Innenraum, den bestimmte Wissenschaften nutzen. Spezialisierung gibt es nur an der Peripherie, die sich auf die Hierarchie beziehen oder geographisch gemeint sein kann. Ist Spezialisierung der Quell von institutionellem Erfolg?

Im negativen Abdruck von Nietzsches Kritik liest sich das so: Im Zeitalter des Historismus gilt es vor allem, das heterogene Wissen zu meistern: Man tut so, als wolle man lieber einen Grafen als einen Juden, und Roethe nimmt — weil es einen zweiten Schmidt nicht gebe — selbst das Amt auf sich. Gustav Roethe schrieb an Wolfgang von Oettingen am 7. Geigers Verhaltensmaxime lautet, stets auf die spezifische Situation und auf die einzelne Sache bezogen zu antworten.

Sie entspringt dem diszipliniert-defensiven Habitus des Trennens, der einem auch in der Rezension von Hehns antisemitischem Buch begegnet. Als Jude bin ich 38 Partei, als Literarhistoriker bin ich parteilos. Doch der Gegenstand selbst leistet dem nicht Folge. Die Historia von D. Doch Goethe hatte — wie wir wissen — anderes im Sinn als Lessing.

Diese Freiheit verdankt er der spekulativen Konstruktion seiner Naturphilosophie. Denn alles zu wissen verhindert die Form. Die Entscheidung erzeugt die unterscheidbaren Gestalten. Daher ist die Geschichte Goethes Gegner: Um die Welt zu gestalten, unterstellt er die Traditionen aus dieser Welt seiner naturphilosophischen Konstruktion, die auch den Faust, Zweiter Teil bestimmt: Das hat Geiger nicht wahr haben wollen und liebt in Goethe seinen Lessing.

Denn die Kultur ist zu schwach, um sich gegen ihren eigenen Antisemitismus zu wehren. Gedanken sind universal, doch wenn aus ihnen literarische Werke geschaffen werden, kehrt das Leben mit seinen Vorurteilen wieder ein. Sie sind zu schwach, sich dagegen zu wehren. Heteronome kulturelle Werte, die in die Texte aufgenommen werden, behalten viel von ihrem alten Sinn. Geigers Haltung in den Berliner Vorlesungen ist ebenso verzweifelt wie trotzig. Camden House, , 65— Suhrkamp, , Germanistische Literaturwissenschaft vor und nach , hrsg.

Metzler, , — Presses universitaires du Septentrion, Mit einem Bildnis Berlin: Reimer, , — Ludwig Geiger, Geschichte der Juden in Berlin: Ludwig Geigers Erinnerung an die zweite Rabbinerversammlung in Frankfurt am Mohr, , Geiger, Die Deutsche Literatur und die Juden, Enterprises, , 55— Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte bis Fischer, , 44— Ludwig Geiger hat mich besucht, u. Die Entwicklung der Germanistik bei Wilhelm Scherer. Lang, , — Emanzipation und Akkulturation —, Bd.

Beck, , Ein deutsch-israelisches Symposion, hrsg. Suhrkamp, , — Winfried Menninghaus und Klaus R. Julius Bab, Goethe und die Juden Berlin: Personen, Sachen, Begriffe A-K, hrsg. Doch das Leben Goethes ist ebenso exoterisch wie eine kulturgeschichtliche Idee. Mai , in Briefe der Jahre —, Bd.

Beck, , Nr. Friedmar Apel Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker-Verlag, , — Unter dem Stichwort Ludwig Geiger las ich folgendes: Diese schlug sich eindeutig auch in ihren wissenschaftlichen Interessen, in ihrem literarischen Kanon nieder. Die endlich aufleuchtende Sonne deutscher Herrlichkeit blendet fast zu sehr. Das deutsche Volk verliert den zweideutigen Titel der Dichter und Denker. Dieses erstreckte sich von Themen Amir Eshel: Jahrhunderts bis hin zur Geschichte der Juden in Berlin Zwischen Lernen und Verlernen, auf der Suche nach einem nie ganz erreichbaren Fixpunkt der inneren Geographie: Es scheint mehr bestimmt stolpernd zu ma13 chen, als begangen zu werden.

Am Oved Publishers, , —, hier Briefe von und an Michael Bernays Berlin: Ehlermann, , —80, hier Writings on Jewish Heritage and Renaissance, vol. Am Oved Publishers, , —42, hier — Mai , Peter Szondi: Suhrkamp, , — Februar , Peter Szondi: Fischer Verlag, , Sein Vorschlag dazu ist eine kritische Fachgeschichte, die die vom Philologen getroffene Wahl des Gegenstandes als Wertung versteht. Dazu eine generelle Anmerkung: Sie werden demontiert und neu formuliert, und erst dann folgen Antworten und Stellungnahmen. Auch hier haben die meisten die ihnen vorgelegten Fragen zuerst einmal kritisiert und umformuliert, bevor sie sie beantworteten.

Die Reaktionen gingen wieder in die gleiche Richtung: Es gibt einen Brief an Karl Wolfskehl, in dem Berend schrieb: Bei Goethe ist das nicht so. Anders als Geiger wollte er ihn aber nicht interpretieren, sondern in der Edition seiner Schriften selbst sprechen lassen. Er scheint ihn regelrecht zu vermeiden.

Noch ein Wort zur Rolle der Editionsphilologie. Berend hatte unmittelbar nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg drei Versuche unternommen, sich zu habilitieren, und ist dreimal abgewiesen worden. Berend hatte bereits in den Jahren nach den Plan einer historischen Gesamtausgabe entworfen und sich damit an Roethe gewandt, der vermitteln sollte.

Gegen diesen bayerischen Nationalismus trat Roethe an. Eine letzte Bemerkung zur Rolle des bayerischen Partikularismus. Das war die Literatur von Frauen. Alle anderen wurden bis ins zwanzigste Jahrhundert meistens nur von Doktorandinnen bearbeitet. Die beiden Dinge zusammen: Ich spreche nicht als Jude, sondern als Literaturhistoriker. Als Jude bin ich 10 Partei, als Literaturhistoriker bin ich parteilos. Talking about identity politics it became again clear through this talk, how important positionality is.

I would like to join Mr. Of course it is a justified reaction to a universalism that was not universal. We have to get back to the nineteenth century in many ways and to the Enlightenment and to a real public sphere, where identity politics will no longer be necessary. Die Nazis sind undeutsch. I am the one who is German. Over the years he slowly had to acknowledge his marginality in this culture.

Synonyms and antonyms of kapol in the Malay dictionary of synonyms

Geiger was for a time associated with this project. Max Koch was also Jewish, but a very ardent nation12 alist. He underwent some of the same tensions that have been discussed here. The battle between nationalism and cosmopolitanism was fought out to some extent in turn-of-the-century Germany over the field of Comparative Literature, which never really got very far in spite of these early efforts of Max Koch, which were somewhat misguided.

I think the classic text here is the review by Benedetto Croce in La 94 2: But there were other forces also at work. There were Jewish comparatists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Incidentally the allusion to Peter Szondi is I think quite apt here too, because Szondi thought of himself essentially not as a Germanist, but as a comparatist and did very important work in the study of Comparative Literature. But in Germany the field had hard going in a large part, because of the pressures of cultural nationalism when someone had the temerity to ask for a chair in Comparative Literature at the turn of the century.

Well, we need more chairs for Germanistik, how could we afford such a luxury? And this is the story, it seems to me in large part, until shortly after the Second World War when the situation had radically changed. But there was obviously an opportunity missed here. I think the fact that Jewish scholars were drawn toward comparative study — and this has been the case in the United States since the Second World War also to some extent — I think that the awareness of the incentive of a cosmopolitan approach to literature was certainly not limited to Jewish scholars but seized on by them.

It may be that their Jewishness rendered them somewhat more disposed to do so. Nur eine kurze Anmerkung zu dem Kanon. Erzberger, Friedrich Naumann, Prof. Ludwig Geiger, Hermann Bahr, Prof. Dezember Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach. Seine Briefe und Dichtungen von —, 3 Theile, hrsg. Nomos, , vor allem 46— Maurersche Buchhandlung, und , Stuttgart: Cotta, und Leben und Briefe einer deutschen Frau Stuttgart: Ehlermann, , —, hier Breslau was one of the few German universities in which it was possible for a Jew to hold this post. Syndikat, , — A Tradition in Ruins Disclaimer: Soweit wir wissen, waren die Frauen nicht miteinander bekannt.

Sie bewegten sich in unvereinbaren politischen und theoretischen Welten und kannten die Arbeiten der anderen wahrscheinlich nicht. Das beginnt bereits bei einem gemeinsamen Interesse, das die Autorinnen noch in Deutschland entwickelten: Rahel Levin Varnhagen und Rosa Lux2 emburg.

In ihre Leben griff die Geschichte mit einer Gewalt ein, der sich keine entziehen konnte. Es wird im folgenden also um Texte gehen, die nicht im Kontext der Wissenschaft als Beruf, sondern dem eines kritischen Denken als Berufung entstanden sind. November an Carl Friedrich von Reinhard. Goethe und Charlotte von Stein von als Motto voranstellt.

Aus der Pandora zitiert sie Prometheus, der sagt: Was aber nehmen die Autorinnen mit aus Deutschland und was zieht in den Jahren nach der Flucht ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf sich? Ebenso wie Bertha Badt-Strauss sah sie nun einen wesentlichen Teil ihrer Arbeit darin, deutschsprachige Schriftsteller an die Sprache ihres neuen Landes zu vermitteln. Beide begannen sehr schnell, auf Englisch zu publizieren. Mitgeschleppt werden all die unsichtbaren Lasten, die man nicht loswird. Und gleichzeitig liegt darin eine Chance.

Dies war einfacher als die Sprache zu wechseln, und gleichzeitig war es viel schwieriger: Geburtstag von Margarete Susman an diese schrieb: Er versteht sie nur als Interpretin seiner eigenen Arbeit, nicht als Theoretikerin eigenen Rechts. Hiob oder Die Vier Spiegel.

Juni entschieden aus: Haben Sie herzlichen Dank. Seit vielen Jahren litt sie an Multipler Sklerose und 28 konnte sich eine solche Arbeit sicher nicht mehr zutrauen. Ein kurzer Aufsatz im Aufbau ist es, der den Kontext ihrer sonstigen Publikationen umso nachhaltiger sprengt.

Und der Heilige, 29 gelobt sei ER, befreite uns aus ihrer Hand. Aber daneben stellt sich doch sofort die Frage: Hatten denn nicht wir, die deutschen Juden, an diesem Geist, diesem Wesen teil? Haben wir nicht in jenem Lande mitgelebt, seine Schicksale mitgetragen, seine Gedanken mitgedacht? Sprechen wir nicht seine Sprache? Haben wir nicht alles, was wir wissen und selber sind, in deutscher Sprache empfangen?

Nannten wir uns nicht und waren wir nicht Deutsche? Wir mussten uns selbst zerreissen, um nicht mehr Deutsche zu sein, und wir haben 31 es getan. Hannah Arendt hat also in der Adressierung ihres Buches an ihre verlorene Heimat einen anderen Akzent gesetzt als in dem Buch, das ihren Namen als Autorin in der neuen Welt etablierte. Denn diese impliziert eine scharfe Trennung theoretischer und litera- Barbara Hahn: Die Deutung einer grossen Liebe: Doch wer liebt wen? Sie verbrannte ihre Briefe an Goethe am Ende ihres Lebens, und daher ist sie so stumm wie die Frau im kulturtheoretischen Modell Europas, das Mar36 garete Susman in den 20er Jahren entworfen hatte.

Susman arbeitet mit verschobenen Darstellungsformen oder besser gesagt: Wechsel der Schreibweisen nach Die Wege der drei Autorinnen in der Emigration gehen weit auseinander, wenn wir die Schreibweise ihrer Texte betrachten. Nie bewegte sie sich schreibend Barbara Hahn: Diese Gesellschaft funktioniert nach den Regeln der Demokratie. Anders Margarete Susmans Schreibkonzept. Jahrhunderts suspendierte, versuchte Margarete Susman mit ihrem Schreiben einen Halt zu finden.

Jeder einzelne Ge- 3: Bertha Badt-Strauss, Barbara Hahn: Keiner ihrer eigenen Texte ist jemals fertig, abgeschlossen, erledigt. Und doch liegt in diesem offenen Verfahren eine Begrenzung. Vor allem nicht zur Politik. Hannah Arendt trennt Philosophie und Politik, sie trennt Geschichtsschreibung von literarischen Schreibweisen. So unwahrscheinlich es also ist, gerade ein solches Leben biographisch zu bearbeiten, findet Peter Nettl doch Punkte der Synthetisierung. Ihr gelingt keine Geschichtsschreibung, wenn sie Rahel Levins Lebens skizziert. Sie will in ihrem Text etwas anderes versuchen: Jeder Brief ist selbst schon eine Mischung aus narrativen und reflektierenden Momenten, aus philosophischen und politischen Gedankensplittern, die nie in ein System gebracht werden.

Rosa Luxemburg trennte Diskurse. Und es gab Leidenschaften, die sich nicht in die Welt der Texte integrieren liessen. Hannah Arendt konnte wie Rahel Levin nicht trennen. Dieses Textverfahren, das sie aus Barbara Hahn: An einer Frage ohne Antwort. Eine zerbrochene Tradition ist nicht einfach durch eine andere zu ersetzen. Den Bruch zu lesen, bleibt immer noch aufgegeben. Ein Dank zu ihrem Rahel und ihre Zeit: Rentsch, ; Rahel Varnhagen: Beck, , —65 und — Zitiert wird im folgenden aus der vierten Auflage, hrsg. Barbara Hahn Frankfurt am Main: Frauen in den Kulturwissenschaften. Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, ed.

Liliane Weissberg Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, , 3—69, hier 39— Allerdings sagt Epimetheus hier: Piper, , Harcourt and Brace, Die beiden Ausgaben unterscheiden sich bekanntlich erheblich; auf die Unterschiede kann hier nur kurz eingegangen werden. Es bleibt die Muttersprache: Piper, , 44—70, hier 58— Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, , Luchterhand, , Susman hatte Die Stimme spricht im Morgen rezensiert, vgl.

Luchterhand, , hier Bd. Die englische Fassung von Arendts Rezension war bereits erschienen; vgl. Auflage , nach der im folgenden zitiert wird, hier